In the wake of the recent death of the highly regarded Jesuit moral theologian, McCormick. One memory from that seminar has remained with me. We were discussing some controversial issue in moral theology when McCormick observed that behind most controversial moral issues in Roman Catholicism was a question of authority, and behind
bishops and indeed all the clergy insofar as they failed to recognize the shared responsibility of the whole church in the discovery of moral truth.
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A central theme in McCormick's writing concerned the need to see the teaching process as a thoroughly ecclesial process and not as a process in which a select few, the bishops, imparted some special knowledge, unique to the bishops, to the rest of the church. Consequently, he often complained of an ecclesiastical atmosphere of suspicion and coercion that discourages bishops both from freely investigating controversial matters and from voicing views in opposition to the current official position. This atmosphere weakens not just the episcopal magisterium but the papal magisterium as well for in this situation the papacy is deprived of the corporate wisdom of all the bishops and, through them, the wisdom of all the churches. In one of the more clever of his many short essays published in the Jesuit journal of opinion, America, McCormick wrote of the tumult caused by Pope John Paul II's apostolic letter on the ordination of women, Ordinatio sacerdotalis. 4 He observed that if it was the intention of the pope to foreclose debate on this controversial topic by means of this papal action, the pope had failed. He then drew from the lessons of history, offering extended excerpts from two letters, each written by an esteemed and influential cardinal to the pope of their time. The first was written four centuries ago by St. Robert
Bellarmine. In it he advised Pope Clement VIII not to act peremptorily on the raging theological controversy of the time, the debate between Dominicans and Jesuits over the relationship between human freedom on the one hand, and divine omniscience and grace on the other. Bellarmine counseled the pope to take one of two courses of action, either:
1) leave the matter open and silence all parties, thus ending the vituperous rhetoric employed by both sides of the debate, or 2) establish either a theological commission or an episcopal synod to draw carefully on the insight of learned parties from different perspectives before coming to any decisive conclusion on the matter (significantly, Pope
Clement chose the latter course of action). The second letter was composed in March of 1968 by Cardinal Léon Suenens and addressed to Pope Paul VI. Suenens was concerned of a growing perception that the pope was making unilateral decisions on controversial matters without sufficient consultation. Suenens wrote:
It is felt that these controversial issues need to be studied openly and thoroughly by qualified theologians and experts who are recognized as such, and that the results of their work should them be submitted to the bishops for discussion. As long as there is no such open debate, it will be impossible to create the receptive climate essential to any authority.
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McCormick wisely left it to the reader to discern the inference contained in the conjoining of these letters. Clearly the wisdom of these two great cardinals had much to offer us today regarding the need for collaborative and collegial exercises of authority.
II. Response Owed to the Ordinary Non-Infallible Magisterium
A second topic addressed frequently in McCormick's writing was the appropriate response owed by the believer to the teaching of the non-infallible, ordinary magisterium.
Soon after Vatican II McCormick began to question the adequacy of Lumen gentium
#25's presentation of the response that is owed to this category of church teaching. For
McCormick, the obsequium religiosum of mind and will called for in that passage invites an overly juridical reading in which one's response to the ordinary magisterium is presented within the paradigm of command-obedience. McCormick wrote:
Embedded in such a concept is a paternalistic attitude toward teaching where the teacher possesses the truth and the taught are dispensed from personal reflection and assimilation, and are asked simply to accept.
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He called for a significant updating of the teaching of Lumen gentium # 25 in order to bring it more into accord with the larger developments of the council. These developments sought to move beyond a juridical view of the church in favor of an appreciation of the church as the people of God. 7 McCormick concluded that the language of "obedience," "assent," and "submission" was simply not adequate to the complex reality that confronts a believer who struggles with a given teaching.
Even as he called for a re-formulation of the response that is owed to noninfallible teaching, he insisted that this response must begin with the acknowledgement that the pope and bishops act as official and authoritative teachers and deserve the "presumption of truth." This obsequium religiosum may not, however, always yield, at least initially, an internal assent. What must be present from the beginning is a docility in attitude which would include: 1) a reverence for the teacher and his office, 2) a readiness to reassess his/her own position, 3) a reluctance to conclude that the magisterium is clearly in error, 4) external behavior that fosters respect for the magisterium. Generally, this attitude of docility will bring the believer to the point of offering an internal assent to the given teaching. However, in those rare instances when it does not, McCormick insisted, the withholding of assent is permissible. 8 Since what is demanded, strictly speaking, in response to the ordinary non-infallible magisterium is not the internal assent itself but only this docility, he contended that juridical sanctions against those who do not arrive at an internal assent are wholly inappropriate. In several places he would sketch out a more adequate rendering of the appropriate response to non-infallible teaching. In place of the language of obedience, submission and assent he characterized the appropriate response of the believer to the teaching of the ordinary magisterium as a "docile personal assimilation and appropriation of authentic teaching" into one's religious infallible exercise of the ordinary magisterium). 10 Once again, for McCormick, the middle ground lies in the "presumption of truth" to be owed to these teachings, and the attitude of docility which this presumption engenders-a presumption, however, that must give way in the face of contrary evidence.
Later in his career McCormick felt compelled to add a gloss to the third characteristic of this attitude of docility, that is the reluctance to conclude to the error of the magisterium. This reluctance to conclude to magisterial error was based on the assumption that the magisterium's teaching embodied the wisdom of the whole church.
However, later in his career McCormick observed that more and more "dissent in the
Church is related to the suspicion that the wisdom resident in the entire Church has not gone into some teachings." 11 Respect for the teaching office of pope and bishops cannot blind us to the possibility that these teachers can short-circuit the teaching-learning process and thereby undermine their own credibility.
III. The Right to and Value of Legitimate Public Dissent
Closely related to the question of the appropriate response of the believer to the ordinary magisterium is the possibility of legitimate public dissent, particularly by McCormick's view of the response owed to teachings proposed by the ordinary non-infallible magisterium, discussed above, suggested the possibility that a sincere attempt at a docile assimilation of a particular teaching into one's religious stance might not always end in internal assent. In such instances, even the manualists and Vatican documents granted the permissibility of privately withholding assent. 13 The difficulties arose when one considered the possible legitimacy of public dissent.
McCormick acknowledged the distinction between private dissent and "public and organized" dissent, of the kind usually associated with public petitions and the like.
He admitted that this kind of organized public dissent was risky-it could be perceived as an attack on the authority of the magisterium itself, it tended toward polarization and could inhibit serious reflection. In his view there were essentially only two warrants that 12 McCormick, Critical Calling, 30-5. 13 McCormick, Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 Theology: through 1980 could be offered in defense of such public and organized dissent: 1) when less sensational forms of dissent are ineffective and 2) when an unopposed error would cause great harm. 14 Early in his career he argued that because of the risks involved in such public and organized dissent, the burden must be on the dissenter to demonstrate its necessity. However, there were times when certain forms of public dissent were called In his exchange with Hamer, 16 occasioned by an article he had co-authored on direct sterilization, McCormick questioned the view that when a theologian had difficulties with a particular teaching of the ordinary magisterium, they were to address their concerns to the proper church authority or, at the most, limit the publication of those concerns to professional theological journals. He contended that the obligation to limit the articulation of one's reservations only to the appropriate ecclesiastical authority 14 Ibid., 250.
15 Ibid., 783. 16 This correspondence is summarized in Critical Calling, 73-8.
depended upon an "outdated" ecclesiology. Such a view failed to acknowledge both the competencies of all the faithful in discerning the truth and the public character of the theological enterprise. Regarding the slightly more expansive view that one should limit the articulation of dissent to professional journals, McCormick observed that this too reflected a kind of ecclesiastical paternalism toward the faithful, but also that such limitations were simply no longer possible given the way in which the secular media now regularly drew on the work published in even the most esoteric of journals.
Nothing of substance came of his exchange with Hamer; it was the CDF's investigation of Curran that really brought the question of legitimate public dissent into sharp relief. In their investigation of Curran the CDF had rejected Curran's claim to legitimate public dissent with respect to teaching proposed by the ordinary magisterium.
They argued that such public dissent might "cause scandal among the faithful" and that the Catholic church had a right to demand that representatives of its academic institutions present Catholic teaching "reflected upon, taught and interpreted in complete fidelity."
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In several essays McCormick took issue with these positions. First, regarding the fear of scandal, he noted that in its traditional, technical meaning, scandal "refers to an action or omission that provides another or others with the occasion of sin." 18 If this was the meaning of scandal assumed by the CDF then their view was apparently that public dissent, particularly on moral issues, might encourage others to commit those actions deemed immoral by the official position but questioned by the dissenter. Yet McCormick rightly observed that this view begs the question. If a theologian is dissenting from a demand that we love God and neighbor, that we forgive without limits, that we refrain from judging others. The transformative power of so many of the gospel narratives and parables lies in the way in which the reader is invited into an alternative "world" that demands a whole new set of values and attitudes in keeping with the demands of God's reign. We are dealing with a set of moral claims concerned not with specific behaviors but with our most basic attitudes and intentions. This conversion is realized concretely in our human actions; our love of God manifests itself and is perfected in our love of neighbor.
Morality then is concerned with the transformation of human motivations and human intentionality. In the life of communion we desire to "be good" as an end in itself.
This moral "goodness," however, pertains primarily to the person; moral goodness resides not in acts themselves, but in human intentions and attitudes as they relate to human actions. The first category of moral truths then, includes those moral norms concerned with salvation and the call to conversion precisely because these norms place claims on human intentions, attitudes and dispositions. As variations on the law of love, these moral truths are "truths of salvation" and belong to divine revelation. Since divine revelation is concerned with that which directly pertains to our salvation, one can imagine then, a defined moral dogma the content of which is one or another of these universal norms.
This leads to a second category of moral teachings. We believe that a morally Auer. 29 David contended that the bishops' competency to propose concrete moral norms belonged not to their teaching magisterium or Lehramt but to their pastoral office or
Hirtenamt. Auer saw such norms as offering guidelines for Christian living, but guidelines whose claims to allegiance went no further then the intrinsic value of the arguments adduced in support of these directives. In a similar fashion, Louis Janssens limited the authority of such concrete moral norms to the validity of the reasons given in support of those norms. 30 Other theologians like Walter Kerber 31 insisted that the magisterium did possess a doctrinal competence in teaching all aspects of the natural law.
These theologians argued not from the assumption that all of the natural law is, strictly speaking, revealed, but because the moral law is ultimately concerned with human selfunderstanding and this human self-understanding, for the Christian, has been transformed by Christ. Consequently, Jesus Christ, who is the sum and mediation of all divine revelation (Dei Verbum # 2), sheds light on all moral matters. McCormick appeared to be in sympathy with central concerns raised on both sides of the debate. 32 Where the magisterium was not infallibly pronouncing on divine revelation, appeals to human reasoning and experience must play a much greater role in the teaching process than is generally evident in church pronouncements on specific moral matters. One-sided appeals to formal authority will not suffice. In order to grasp adequately the distinctive character of the magisterium's teaching competency on concrete moral matters we must recognize that not only is the notion of competency to be understood as analogous, so too is the notion of the assistance of the Holy Spirit. 35 We must distinguish between that special assistance of the Spirit offered in those rare instances in which the church teaches infallibly in proclaiming divine revelation and that assistance operative in the teaching of the ordinary magisterium. In the latter instance it is vital that the assistance of the Holy Spirit be closely associated with the entire teaching-learning process. The doctrinal competency of the bishops to teach authoritatively but not infallibly regarding concrete moral matters is derived largely from the teaching process itself. Here McCormick re-directs attention away from a supernaturalist preoccupation with the charisma veritatis given to the bishops at episcopal ordination, and towards the way in which episcopal teaching articulates the fruit of the church's corporate discernment. The role of authoritative teachers in this process of formulating pastoral directives is clearly one of discernment and articulation, a function fully in harmony with the gifts of the Spirit given to bishops by their ordination.
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It is my contention that McCormick's distinctive contribution to this topic lies in his conviction that the bishops teach authoritatively by articulating, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the corporate faith consciousness and wisdom of the church.
V. Conclusion
In an essay of his entitled, "How My Mind has Changed," McCormick outlined a number of general areas in which he had "changed his mind." Every one of them could be traced to a shift in ecclesiology. 39 That shift constituted a move away from a more pyramidal ecclesiology in which power and truth trickled down from the apex to a view of the church as the people of God, the body of Christ, pilgrim church and temple of the Holy Spirit. This view of the church, however haltingly it was articulated at Vatican II, began with the dignity of the baptized and the spiritual communion which that sacrament constituted. In this nascent ecclesiology, power is manifested and truth disclosed in the communal life of the church in which all the baptized play a vital role. Within this vision of the church, one which served as the essential context for McCormick's own reflections, the ecclesiastical magisterium of the bishops (including the bishop of Rome) plays an essential role by authenticating, guarding and proclaiming the apostolic faith.
Where the bishops teach beyond the ambit of divine revelation, they are given an assistance of the Spirit activated in the employment of the human processes at their
